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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
BOYD WARD, ) 
Petitioner, 
-vs- ) CASE NO. 890347 
RICHFIELD CITY, a municipal 
corporation; et al., 
Respondents. 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This case is before the Supreme Court on Certiorari to 
the Court of Appeals. 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Judicial Review of action of the Governing Body of the 
City of Richfield in dismissing Plaintiff (referred to herein as 
"Ward") as Chief of Police. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Although we believe the Appellant Wardfs Statement of 
Issues for Review to be prolix it will, except for our General 
Statement, be answered in the numerical order assigned by 
Appellant. To the extent they are repetitive we have combined 
them in our responses: 
ISSUE I; THE DISTRICT COURT EXERCISING DISCRETION VESTED IN 
IT RULED THAT TO VOID THE CITY'S ACTION TO REMOVE 
WARD WOULD ENDANGER THE PUBLIC GOOD. 
ISSUE III; 
ISSUE 
ISSUE 
ISSUE 
IV: 
V: 
VI: 
ISSUE II; THE DISTRICT COURT APPLIED SETTLED UTAH LAW THAT 
COINCIDED WITH FORMER §10-6-32, U.C.A. 1953, 
ITSELF RESTATED ELSEWHERE IN THE MUNICIPAL CODE 
AUTHORIZING DISMISSALS. 
NO STATUTE, INCLUDING §52-4-6, REQUIRES FORMAL 
ACTION BY THE GOVERNING BODY TO DISMISS AN 
EMPLOYEE TO BE LISTED ON THE MEETING AGENDA. 
NO ACTION WAS TAKEN IN A CLOSED MEETING TO DISMISS 
WARD. 
APPEAL PROCEDURES UNDER §§10-3-1105 AND 10-3-1106 
EXPRESSLY EXCLUDE (1) POLICE OFFICERS; AND (2) 
DEPARTMENT HEADS; WARD BEING BOTH. 
ACCEPTING THE STIPULATED FACTS AND APPELLANT'S 
ARGUMENT OF FACTS, THE TRIAL COURT'S SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT AGAINST THE APPELLANT (WARD) WAS STILL 
BASED ON UNCONTRADICTED AFFIDAVITS ESTABLISHING 
THE ESSENTIAL FACTS. 
THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY ARTICULATED THE 
EXPRESS LANGUAGE OF THE OPEN AND PUBLIC MEETING 
ACT WHICH IS SUFFICIENTLY CLEAR TO REQUIRE NO 
CONSTRUCTION. 
WARD'S PHANTOM "RICHFIELD CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT 
POLICIES AND PROCEDURES MANUAL". IF ANYTHING AT 
ALL, WAS AUTHORED BY, AND PROVIDES EXCLUSIVE MEANS 
OF APPEALING DISCHARGE ONLY TO AND AS FAR AS, WARD 
AS CHIEF OF POLICE - IN OTHER WORDS HIMSELF. 
ISSUE IX: THE TRIAL COURT'S TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER WAS 
RECALLED BY THE ISSUING COURT ON THE BASIS THAT 
ENFORCEMENT WOULD BE INIMICAL TO PUBLIC WELL-
BEING. 
The following are additional Issues which the Court 
might consider in arriving at its decision on Certiorari: 
ISSUE X: EVEN IF THE BERUBE1 STANDARDS WERE OFFENDED IN 
THIS CASE (WHICH WE SUBMIT THEY ARE NOT) BERUBE 
SHOULD NOT BE APPLIED RETROSPECTIVELY TO 1981. 
ISSUE VII; 
ISSUE VIII; 
ISSUE XI: THE OPEN AND PUBLIC MEETING ACT (CH. 4, TITLE 52, 
U.C.A. 1953) IS NOT A DUE PROCESS STATUTE. 
^erube vs. Fashion Centre, Ltd., 771 P.2d 1033 (Utah 1989) 
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ISSUE XII: THERE WAS NO BREACH OF THE IMPLIED COVENANT OF 
GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING; THAT ISSUE IS RES 
JUDICATA. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, 
ORDINANCES, AND REGULATIONS 
Title 52, Chapter 4, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as 
amended (Open and Public Meeting Act): 
*** 
52-4-3. Meetings open to the public - Exceptions. 
Every meeting is open to the public unless closed 
pursuant to Sections 52-4-4 and 52-4-5. 
*** 
52-4-6. Public notice of meetings. 
(1) Any public body which holds regular meetings that 
are scheduled in advance over the course of a year 
shall give public notice at least once each year of its 
annual meeting schedule as provided in this section. 
The public notice shall specify the date, time, and 
place of such meetings. 
(2) In addition to the notice requirements of Sub-
section (1) of this section, each public body shall 
give not less than 24 hours* public notice of the 
agenda, date, time and place of each of its meetings. 
(3) Public notice shall be satisfied by: 
(a) posting written notice at the principal 
office of the public body, or if no such office 
exists, at the building where the meeting is to be 
held; and 
(b) providing notice to at least one newspaper of 
general circulation within the geographic 
jurisdiction of the public body, or to a local 
media correspondent. 
(4) When because of unforeseen circumstances it is 
necessary for a public body to hold an emergency 
meeting to consider matters of an emergency or urgent 
nature, the notice requirements of Section 52-4-6(2) 
may be disregarded and the best notice practicable 
given. No such emergency meeting of a public body 
shall be held unless an attempt has been made to notify 
all of its members and a majority votes in the 
affirmative to hold the meeting. 
*** 
3 
52-4-8. Suit to void final action - Limitation-
Exceptions. 
Any final action taken in violation of Sections 52-4-3 
and 52-4-6 is voidable by a court of competent 
jurisdiction. Suit to void final action shall be 
commenced within 90 days after the action except that 
with respect to any final action concerning the 
issuance of bonds, notes, or other evidences of 
indebtedness suit shall be commenced within 30 days 
after the action. 
*** 
Rule 65Af Utah Rules of Civil Procedure [Temporary 
Restraining Orders; Essential Conditions and Recitals] 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. On April 2, 1981, the Richfield City Council held 
a public meeting after promulgating an agenda as, to the extent 
and in form required by §52-4-6 (1981). The agenda did not list 
consideration of Ward's discharge as Chief of Police. 
2. Following discussion of items on the agenda, the 
Council voted to hold a closed meeting and invited Ward to join 
them in discussing his position as Chief of Police. The Council 
was concerned about several recent resignations within the police 
department. Discussion of Ward's termination ensued and the 
Council decided to terminate Ward. The Council resumed open 
session and formally voted to discharge Ward effective April 3, 
1981. 
3. On April 6, 1981, Ward submitted a written request 
to the Council for an administrative appeal pursuant to §§10-3-
1105 and -1106 (1981). The request was immediately denied 
because these Code sections exclude members of police departments 
as well as department heads; as the Court of Appeals held (776 
4 
P. 2d at 97). Ward did nothing thereafter until threats were made 
by his lawyer to Richfieldfs attorney that a lawsuit would be 
filed. On June 5, 1981, the Council again promulgated notice 
that a special meeting would be held on June 8, 1981, and 
specifically mentioned in the Agenda the consideration of a 
motion to ratify its action taken at the April meeting. This 
agenda included Ward's discharge as an item for discussion. 
Prior to the meeting, Ward served the Council with a temporary 
restraining order, to restrain it from taking any further action 
against him. Strictly construing the temporary restraining 
order, the Council ratified its decision to terminate Ward and 
took no further action against Ward. 
4. On June 17, 1981, the trial court held a 
preliminary injunction hearing and determined that pursuant to 
the removal statute for chiefs of police, §10-3-911 (repealed 
1987), it had no jurisdiction to hear the matter. [§10-3-911 
stated in part that " [t]he chief of police or fire department of 
the cities may at any time be removed, without a trial, hearing 
or opportunity to be heard, by the board of commissioners 
whenever in its opinion the good of the service will be served 
thereby."] 
5. Ward appealed the trial court's decision to the 
Utah Supreme Court and this Court decided in Ward vs. Richfield 
City, 716 P.2d 265 (Utah 1984), that the trial court did have 
jurisdiction because §10-3-911 did not pertain to third class 
cities. On remand, the trial court, based upon irrefutable 
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affidavits, granted summary judgment in favor of Richfield City. 
The court ruled the April 2nd Agenda listed "other business" 
under which personnel matters were considered and that it was not 
in the public interest to void the Council's action at either the 
April 2 or the June 8, 1981, meeting. 
6. Ward contends on appeal that the Council: (1) 
violated the Public Meetings Act on April 2, 1981; (2) on June 
8th acted in violation of the temporary restraining order; (3) 
wrongfully denied Ward the right to appeal his discharge; and (4) 
he is entitled to reinstatement, back pay and $600,000.00 
damages. 
7. The Trial Court was affirmed by the Court of 
Appeals. 776 P.2d 93 (1989). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Boyd Ward, prior to 1981, was appointed Chief of Police 
by then Mayor Kendrick Harward. In that appointment the 
Richfield City Council concurred. (Complaint 1(3; R.3) 
On April 2, 1981, during a regular meeting of the City 
Council for which an agenda was posted and delivered as required 
by the Open Meeting Law (Ch. 4, Title 52, U.C.A., 1953) an 
executive session was held to which Ward was personally invited 
and during which he was interviewed and his ability to lead the 
police force was considered and evaluated. Six members of the 
police force had been fired or resigned within recent months and 
a majority of the remaining members of the force had expressed 
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their determination to resign immediately unless Wardfs services 
as chief of police were terminated. (R. 234) 
The minutes of the meeting of April 2, 1981, show that 
the Council and Mayor went into executive session to which Ward 
was invited. [R. 229, 230 (uncontradicted Affidavit of then 
Mayor Kendrick Harward, now deceased) and passim] 
In careful observance of §52-4-4 no action of any 
nature was taken either by ordinance, resolution, rule, 
regulation or order during the executive session. (R. 230) 
Nad R. Brown had been appointed to the City Council to 
fill a vacancy in February, 1981. His appointment was unanimous 
with the remaining City Council and Mayor. (R. 225) He 
abstained from the vote. (R. 226) Had the Council been disposed 
summarily to dismiss Ward they would have chosen a new councilman 
pre-dedicated to that purpose. 
After the executive session was concluded the Council 
went back into open session and it was officially determined by 
the Mayor and its Council, with Nad Brown abstaining, that the 
services of Ward as chief of police should be terminated. (R. 
225; Harward Affidavit) 
Ward was immediately notified of his termination and 
was told by the Mayor that "he could be heard by the City Council 
which Ward expressly and unqualifiedly declined". (R. 236-
emphasis added) 
Ward waited two months (3 meetings) before he made any 
move. Demonstrative of Wardfs disinterest in a hearing is 
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graphic in his failure to express any desire for City Council 
review until the second monthly meeting after April (June 8th) 
although he did write a letter citing an inapplicable statute. 
(R. 47) He ignored (if he wanted to appear to argue his 
dismissal) two meetings in May and only reacted when the City, 
after being threatened with a lawsuit, gave redundant notice of 
the re-affirmation Agenda to which Ward responded with an ex 
parte Temporary Restraining Order secured without notice. 
Although Ward knew the City's legal counsel was within minutes of 
the Courthouse Ward's counsel omitted to notify him. This 
manifests an intention on Ward's part not to be reinstated but 
rather to extort money damages in punitive form from Richfield. 
Ward excludes from his enumeration and description of 
prior proceedings this extraordinary ex parte appearance before 
Judge Tibbs which alone (albeit numerous other reasons exist any 
one of which) demonstrates sufficient reason to sustain the 
Summary Judgment later entered by the Trial Court: Ward's only 
significant claim is that the Temporary Restraining Order ("TRO") 
which was dissolved when the Court heard the facts had forever 
precluded the Governing Body from dismissing Ward; in other 
words, the TRO was a final judgment. 
Having both dissolved the TRO and held that the June 8, 
1981 meeting was valid (R. 387) the Trial Court left standing an 
unchallengeable dismissal of Ward which was effected regularly, 
properly, and decisively on June 8, 1981 and, as recited in the 
decision of the Trial Court entered on September 29, 1986 -
8 
The Court finds that it would net be in the 
public interest to void the action taken by 
the Richfield City Council on April 2, 1981, 
and as ratified *y ..•• 1981 
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IM " Temporary Restraining Order was not 
properly endorsed by the Clerk as required by Rule 65A. (Id.) 
[The entire text of Rule 65A is annexed as a part of 
the Appendix (pp. i.l).] 
We have attached the 2-page Order granting Defendants' 
Motion for Summary Judgment as Appendix pp. ii.l and ii.2. The 
Court issuing the Temporary Restraining Order found that it 
should never have been made effective. In fact, to prevent 
complete civil disorder Judge Tibbs struck from the TRO furnished 
him ex parte a paragraph which would have reinstated Ward. (R. 
10)2 
On June 8, 1981 at a meeting unchallengeable on any 
grounds Ward was discharged as chief of police as determined by 
the Trial Court. Uncontradicted affidavits show that the Mayor 
and City Council voted to terminate Ward and that the dismissal 
was not malicious or in wanton disregard of Ward's rights. (R. 
e.g. 229-234 and passim, 235-254) 
These affidavits on file, totally uncontradicted, 
demonstrate that the termination of Ward was reasonable, not 
arbitrary nor capricious nor with intent to damage Ward 
personally nor to injure his reputation. The affidavits show 
that his reputation suffered no injury. Those affidavits are 
uncontested (he was subsequently elected Constable). 
Ward is raising many issues on appeal that were not 
presented to the Trial Court including the so-called "Richfield 
2It is curious that Ward's attorney's choice of words was 
"reinstated". 
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Ward makes the curious argument that .i '"'ird class rity 
has only a rhiof nf (inline nr ni.fi/..1M 1 .tmi IIIHJI i "d^jjuu I nieiil " 
i:p[ertXfiJ in i ", I o " l I o!». The reason he wishes to establish a 
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department hiatus in cities of a third class is obvious since 
§10-3-1105 excludes "members of police departments" as well as 
"heads of departments" from discharge or transfer procedures 
provided in the following Section -1106. 
Section 10-3-813 provides as follows: 
10-3-813. General administrative powers of 
all municipalities. The governing body of 
each municipality shall from time to time 
prescribe the powers and duties to be 
performed by the superintendents, 
supervisors, department directors and all of 
its officers and employees. [Emphasis added] 
Section 10-3-814 provides as follows: 
10-3-814. Personnel assigned to one or more 
departments. The governing body of each 
municipality may assign any individual to one 
or more positions in one or more departments. 
Both of the foregoing statutes use the term "each 
municipality". Section 10-1-104(1) defines "municipality" as 
***any city of the first class, city of the second class, city of 
the third class or town in the State of Utah. [Emphasis added] 
Section 10-3-811 provides as follows: 
10-3-811. Members of the governing body may 
be appointed to administration in cities of 
the third class and towns. The mayor of any 
city of the third class or the mayor of any 
town may, with the advice and consent of the 
majority of the governing body, assign or 
appoint any member or members of the 
governing body to administer one or more 
departments of the municipality and shall by 
ordinance provide the salary for the 
administrator or administrators. 
At page 39 of Ward's brief he makes the illogical 
argument, expressly contrary to statute, that Richfield City 
cannot have a "department for its police". From this position, 
a ] r e a d y u n t e n a b l e , VI.it d p u r s u e s t h e non'sequilur t h a t s i n c e 
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the employment-n1 -dill
 r- -
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I. hi.? case, L lie yyui d '.si^iia t.iy" ib ^  ^  functional dynamic and, 
res p e c t f u l l y , ir is r-ad *, p' r h f i e i ; * - v 
f:arcf u 1 I \" 1111s* *i* v m 1111 1 111 > ^ - ~ ,c_are decisis. 
Ill; predictabil i ty is the operat ive tl.on "signaling; • : *hange r 
the ''mpioyment-at-will law *,,.»*. -i : * leser ; 
categor * . * . immerman?
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employment-at-will rule, lists several considerations (771 P.2d 
at 1041) for adjusting to a change: 
(a) Contravention of a recognized and established 
policy. Hutchison (692 P. 2d 772 - Utah 1984) defines the public 
policy of the State of Utah to be consistent with the conditions 
applicable to Ward's dismissal. 
(b) Express or implied contract term for 
employment. Ward's employment is distinguished neither by any 
statute nor a writing. This is not only spelled out by the 
statutes but admitted by Ward's own Policies (Appendix iii.l and 
iii.2; iv.l and iv.2). Section 10-3-1105 of the Municipal Code 
of 1977 (L'77 Ch 48 §3) excludes members of police departments 
and all heads of departments, for that matter, from statutorily 
supplied tenure. Ward argued in Ward vs. Richfield City I that he 
was not a member of a department because Richfield City had a 
marshal1 or chief of police rather than a police department. 
However, Ward must make himself a member of a department to come 
within Departmental Policy No. 10. As the Court of Appeals 
correctly observed, Ward's argument is palpably self-destructive. 
Treating the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing, paramount in this doctrine is the reasonable 
expectations of the parties. (771 P.2d at 1046) An appropriate 
statement of the Court is that: 
Care must be exercised to avoid eclipsing the 
rule by extending the exception. 771 P.2d 1047 
On that same page the footnote enumerates five possibly 
relevant factors: 
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(i) Whether pr_ _. not _  the__ discharge was for 
legitimate manager] al._rcac>cr *. 1 " ! 
c> * , 4'- ctun] M- . i .it < * H-
 t :. • ue 
force ]• d y f '< : e t ; -osign 4 ho ;.• x* - -a _1 .^:d 
, . ^ e i.
 r ., • M - ~ 
( -r .or net the employee was engaged in 
• sitive managerial , EO.siti.on. Numerous <--^  ^ c ",- ^ ] y 
most L.t..ri:>i , ,< I • onfidentia municipal 
positions, i<j/ ^ li'^H]^' ior> pf '.'us please nrp r., * . c 
Offfct ^ i - . *i .ji»( a:. \ ,\ 19/c . Termination 
sensi t Lvo grounds rhf^i1^ ' <- - -G r1:;--' -5 
1
 ** ^  * . . . . ^ c : . oiiir caiA.<.-'i v«th 
that . : < '. -= in <st; ngui- hc-d employee. 
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; i>nfjJ c"„ j'L. PA*.---.-£. 
am* 'j.iif leant c^nf1'* - ~f Interest under .I.T/ 
view -- _o-. i-i n. 'V superimposing r {~ own 
resolve iu *••*-* * nrrp 
to endanger .. _,*... n- safety. 
(iv) Endangering employer f s ljegit imate .business 
interest. Ri v *" "
 4 HI t--5 * ; * 
have bc-en ;^^ , ,,\
 C/i ,-usiners l.^d "•" - * i 
dismissed A-, . i.ts c/vef 
.^ *.iwfcw... . _..__ 1 »*i >uiidi privacy and 
reiativ s. Here again, -he ;.bvk.;:>, immediate 
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polemics between the chief and his subordinates were 
insoluble. The Governing Body, during lengthy 
confidential interviews with Ward both for months prior 
to, and in the executive session of the meeting itself, 
were down-played to reduce public embarrassment to 
Ward. 
(vi) Discrimination by the employer for 
constitutionally impermissible reasons. We do not 
treat this factor since it appears inapplicable to this 
issue. 
Other possible factors which we most respectfully 
advance as demoralizing to the force and to the City are (a) 
insubordination, and (b) categorical refusal of Ward to alleviate 
tremendous pressures upon the City. Mayor Kendrick Harward (now 
deceased) deposed that Ward was asked to relax excessive and 
noxious disciplining of Ward's subordinates. (R. 233) The 
departmental head of public safety, Duane Wilson, defended Ward's 
performance as chief of police and tried (unsuccessfully) to 
encourage Ward to attenuate displeasure with Ward by his 
policemen. (R. 250-253) 
A negative proposition is sometimes impossible to 
demonstrate. However, the negative of this issue may be 
established by what is offered supporting the existence of the 
phenomenon to be repelled. Ward devotes Issues V through VIII 
(pp. 25-41) of his brief to the claim that Richfield City adopted 
a manual relating to termination which he characterizes 
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,f
 * .. . c ._^4^r .. .or.t , :. 1 -*irts ^rd Procedures Manual" 
("Policies y \ \ - ncrtions * ?( ,+• an;;a. \ which '.r.^ rd « ^1 ies 
c Aaaenaum . ~,..i.i <:, ? I^L..;< - ;4.i Procedures drafted by 
Ward hhTv-p'i "Appendix "*•) J i s srief * - *.' r 
those ' *. l . partmental 
disciplinary authority" \i , ondix ) \ \ : - ;.--J :• z i. ,1 ] including the 
enti re spectrum of discipl i; -^  rro-i -.. verba"! r- r-r i n. 
through dismissal (Mule '») ocoupai . cua , _;.,. ; c< .
 :-t, >.-t 
the Policies, Ward makes himself i he chief executive officer -t 
the department and. f I i lal -V-rarl^cr,4-^ " •;•:' :CM 
operation mull ill iscipl ine t^;L .».- ,x . . , . : -. . . ..< • 
Ward has offered ; , thing else 2eavi:^ s :>rer=ume 
that he has nothing moro. 
Pr^cedun:' <iiii appellant s..h - i . .:J iiui oi . U L .C evidence 
support of the judgment and demonstrate i> ;r ': K, • • ~- evidence, 
including al 1 reasonabl e :i i ifei: ei ices drawn ' - • • 
iiistjjf 1 icLcint. i no suppor t tl le findings against an act ^gains " * 
52(a), In u*- rsttitv oj Bat tell, 776 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1989) • 
:CIFIC RESPONSES TO WARD'S 
rISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW" 
iSSbt, _ i : THE DISTRICT COURT EXERCISING DISCRETION VESTED IN 
IT RULED THAT TO VOID THE CITY'S AC""--v; —-. REMOVE 
WARD WOULD ENDANGER THE PUBLIC GOOD. 
c^porary Restraining 
Order expired and w.ib of r-c -
 : cc rr i effect when ] - Court heard 
this matter uii o^*n^ j. /1 x^ox. * t 
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Although the TRO was never violated by Richfield and 
against Ward's argument to the contrary, the District Court 
concurred in that conclusion; nevertheless, Ward seems to be 
arguing that if an injunction is outstanding any acts done 
inconsistent with the restraints expressed in the injunction are 
void. There are no cases, procedural rules, or any authorities 
stating that such is the result. 
The thesis of Ward is palpably unsound: if the Open 
Meeting Law were not observed then Richfield is forever barred 
from acting upon even any measure however momentous, in a legal 
way. In other words, Ward is complaining that Richfield handled 
the meeting of April 2, 1981, improperly and having done so is 
precluded from ever doing it in a proper way. To follow this 
reasoning if Richfield desired to restore a flood-destroyed 
bridge but failed to be, in its haste to authorize 
reconstruction, state that purpose in an agenda, Richfield would 
be forever foreclosed from restoring the bridge. He is 
complaining that once Richfield made an error they can never 
correct it. He is contending that until the litigation was 
settled there could be no chief of police. It is vital that in 
the TRO Judge Tibbs deleted language Ward's counsel had inserted 
that Ward be reinstated. (R. 10) 
The sensitivity of the position illustrated by the 
affidavits stating that the chief of police had to be replaced 
otherwise the entire force would resign manifests the plight of 
Richfield on April 2, 1981. (R. 234) 
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Even though the Utah Supreme Court has held that §10-3-
911, I J.*"' N.( 19 5 3 applies only to cities of the first and second 
class that statut > nt hci' '^ ivif iii;i««; .ir 1 1 ,n .«•:• rcniu i ruj ohlets of 
police trom t !>•/,- ,i i ±K e : hou!-.; ;• considered in
 (, a i materia. 
The same sensitivity ; .ffic^ '-* '-si^f •• •-•-^  ice sn< 
re ail i 111 i n t" P - <,. ^  - • - - statutes go\ c i. .• *.1 iy 
the method * '.erminat ir.g en • i^ i\- ;.<.' n : hdt position. 
The penalt^ • ^ r violat'"'? r. . * 
v;<>* :«;prp outLt-iiul ,tJ piwLA ii .islanding t h e 
numerous defects njunction anJ tl ? :-> J I U ' P *- -
. ,th^r * -• - * : * ' 
M ^ . u / Lt^tic;.]j ?.<j f)i -ler -ire vr. 2. 
*\n /i*^ * . • o, Injunctions §3 09 * - stated: 
***uie extent. ^ 1 wid pUiixshment *** ;» •. • 
the sound discretion of the Court***" 
lloro the ."thiil fr-mi 1 > .1 wn impose any sanction, 
one of who'll, o • course, couLd have been to void the April 2nd 
meeting. "The same text at p ( -8, Injunctions ^ ln 1 stiti«, th li-
the powei jMjiii.sl' M| 1 i in 1 m injunction lies ui I he 
court which granted the injunction -..•: :_n that court alone-
Al. page 639 (Id.) *" iex< : 
O f f i c i a l s Wl'iO t"l.i';J' '»'• l.iOui'j | , H S I ' "rr n ^ . ^ ^ j ^ ,
 t i 
particular contract on the ground that the contract v; .valid 
cannot be held in contempt for ^n^-or:-•-? ~ ^  I 
proceed i inii I I'M-'ro urn I I-M- II it! if Ichl j. *.- JL < • ,; . ,..;..-.., . new chief of 
police and did nothing further than they had already done ^1 
April 2, 1981 to terminate the ol < i <i ie. . 
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I n State ex rel Cooper vs. Warnock, 134 P. 2d 7 0 6 , 16 
Wash.2d 697 and in Vol. 43A C.J.S. at p. 640, Iniunctions §290 it 
is stated that officials are guilty of contempt in entering into 
new contracts only where they were enjoined from implementing a 
prior one or are in contempt only if a new one is subject to the 
same objection. As an illustration the C.J.S. text recites that: 
"officials restrained from expending money 
under a construction contract, bids for which 
have been irregularly advertised for, do not 
violate the restraining order by cancelling 
the contract, readvertising properly for bids 
and entering into a new contract." (43A 
C.J.S. at 640) 
More importantly and consistent with Richfield1s 
position that it may (and should) rectify any wrong that existed 
in the proceedings, is reinforced in the same volume of Corpus 
Juris which states at p. 640: 
Where the enforcement of an ordinance has 
been enjoined on the ground that certain 
provisions of the ordinance are invalid, the 
passage and enforcement of a new ordinance on 
the same subject, without such invalid 
provisions, are not violations of the 
injunction. 
THE DISTRICT COURT APPLIED SETTLED UTAH LAW THAT 
COINCIDED WITH FORMER §10-6-32, U.C.A. 1953, 
ITSELF RESTATED ELSEWHERE IN THE MUNICIPAL CODE 
AUTHORIZING DISMISSALS. 
THE TRIAL COURT'S TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER WAS 
RECALLED BY THE ISSUING COURT ON THE BASIS THAT 
ENFORCEMENT WOULD BE INIMICAL TO PUBLIC WELL-
BEING. 
In Hutchison vs. CartmighL 692 P. 2d 772, (Utah, Nov. 
14, 1984) per Justice Zimmerman, the Utah Supreme Court, having 
ISSUE II; 
and 
ISSUE IX: 
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bv then decided h:ih f hn /,*>•.,'• .;: : Ru^*u / •' ca^^r^ in a 
c.*»-; *.- * :* * «.. Lw. ..JiiwO :' t -i which haa ;r.-Kie the 
appointment resoivtd the author.] i / r o susfenJ . - : ^  is the 
appointee . u m//t ~ " .hoLM^ .-*, .^vi^ -Lvje/ or 
hearing11 , because unless the statute on appointment or dismissal 
expressly GO |h,v''>sf 'hat officer serves "at the pleasure" of 
the appo . 
Hutchison claimed in hit:* lawsuit that he had been 
dismissed by the Sheriff who had no authorit ;, I'M ffVi I l I v. 
h -;> h - r • - . .. "i was entitled to notice and a 
hearing. 
Justice Zimmerman aL 
i *i,nf i t e s : 
This issue was considered thtnj; . • „!: 
/ t'/tr County vs. Board oj C )mmissioners of 
itii/ /-<*** Ccwrt/.r. 71 Utah 593, 268 P. 783 
(1928). There the Court dealt with ^nc 
question of vhether o jniy commissioners 
could suspend or disr;,] :>s deputy sheriffs 
against the will of the sheriff, ***The 
Court stated that unless otherwise controlled 
by statute, the power to suspend or dismiss 
is appurtenant to the power to appoint. When 
an individual is appointed by an official, 
"the office is held during the pleasure v f 
the authority making the appointment and . . 
no notice or charges or hearings are 
required for the suspension or removal by the 
authority appointing the officer." 
at 596, ;-68 :.. +t ";-:M. [Emphasis added] 
[For t :ie Ou;tt's convenience we have attached 
the Hutchison Deci s i on hi I hi1 Ih mor'andujii | 
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This statement is not just the law of the case. It is 
the law of the State of Utah, broadly affecting all appointed 
public safety personnel (e.g.: "when an individual is appointed 
by an official the office is held during the pleasure of the 
authority ***»). 
"During the pleasure" is entirely different from merely 
the necessity to remove for cause (Rogers vs. Congleton, 84 S.W. 
521 [Ky.]) and gives the agency vested with authority of that 
nature the "unlimited discretion" to effect termination. Taylor 
vs. Spear, 238 P. 1038, 1043; 196 Cal. 709. In London vs. City of 
Franklin, 80 S.W. 514, 515; 118 Ky. 105, the Court said: 
*** the officers named may be "removed at the 
pleasure" of the city council. These words 
have a well-defined legal meaning. The right 
to "remove at pleasure" is an entirely 
different thing from the right to remove for 
cause. To hold that the statute only 
authorizes the council to remove for cause 
would be to deny the words used by the 
Legislature their ordinary meaning. 
As s t a t e d i n Sheriff of Salt Lake County vs. Board of 
Commissioners of Salt Lake County, 71 Utah 5 9 3 , 268 P . 783 
(1928) : 
When an individual is appointed by an 
official the office is held during the 
pleasure of the authority making the 
appointment, and ... no notice or charges or 
hearings are required for the suspension or 
removal by the authority appointing the 
officer. (Cited with approval in Hutchison 
vs. Cartwright, 692 P. 2d 772 at 774 [Nov. 
1984]). 
Taylor vs. Gunderson, 154 P. 2d 653, 107 U 437 (1944) 
holds that a chief of police in a third class city can be removed 
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* * - *. _ . t . . . *\ c a ^ e T>Tas t h a t p r i o r ^a *~\i 
R e v i s e d S t a t u t e s o i --•*"*, " ' - c t i c n t. • •> * i ;*- C o ^ p i l ^ ' i • -v--- -f 
r ^ a b *! °1 7 t-r - v i d e d t v; i*-
: • ,
 t . u i u v c a , v. L c a u s e " . v i s i o n 
e l i m i n a t e d t h e p h r a o o * . n t . i l : eir.^ved f o r c a u s e " and ' " ^ i c f 
J u s t ' '-' V?-1fe V i r1d t l i . i t :•
 v 
< : . --J * ^ i,.*o .-... . , t ,* , .b i i i i so . . . j - i * af or - o l i c p J . -use 
need be shown. The Chief Justice wrote: 
•**Since the statute expressly iequired cause 
for removal and subsequently was changed so 
as to eliminate the words expressly requiring 
cause for removal the indication quite 
clearly is that the legislature intended to 
eliminate the requirement that there be cause 
for removal r>P a rity marshal. 
Nothing in Uio ) ^ / / Muni-.:) pa ] roc.a .->r ' n -v-, other act 
has ever restored * ,-. '-^ai lament that -a > • •* - - ; 
Cor romova ' •»»' "•  >.. . , ce. 
Hoard .' ^t/; • t/^u College vs. Roih, i v o w.u , 
564 (19V2 ' *t ^ " \ t h e c o u i V -•' ' 
T O have a property interest in a benefit. 
person clearly must have more than an 
abstract need or desire for it. He must have 
more than a unilateral expectation of it ~ 
must, instead, ha v *-• * i - q~: *- i r.. -\ 11:- c la:;-
entitlement to it. 
Finrn R, MI,'1. n033 
s t a t e s t h a t t h e C o u r t ^ u g n a i . i n c i o d i f i c a t i o n 
" e m p l o y m e n t - a t - w i l l 1 1 r u l ^ , c o n s i d e r a t e n - summai 
t h e l a w o f ill ah pi . -mu.u.'i 
nf the Neho School District, 558 P . 2d ] 3 0 7 , ( U t a h 1 9 7 6 ) , w h e r e i n 
t h e S u p r e m e C o u r t h e l d t h a t P l a i n t i f f was f i i t 11 l e d un 
rights set forth in her contract of employment. Ward had no 
contract. 
In this case, Ward has not pleaded any reasons by which 
he has a right to retain his position as police chief, he has 
cited no authority which prevents the council from terminating 
him and, indeed, nothing in Utah law gives a police chief any 
right to expect continued employment, absent any other 
consideration. 
Sections 10-3-911 and 10-3-1106 are the only statutes 
which confer any rights on municipal employees in cities of the 
third class. Section 10-3-1105 provides: 
All appointive officers and employees of 
municipalities, other than members of the 
police departments, fire departments, heads 
of departments, and superintendents shall 
hold their employment without limitation of 
time, being subject to discharge or dismissal 
only as hereinafter provided. [Emphasis 
added] 
Section 10-3-1106 provides that no officer or employee 
covered by §10-3-1105 shall be discharged except pursuant to a 
hearing and an appeal process set forth in §10-3-1106. 
Section 10-3-1105 specifically exempts from the due 
process and job protection provisions of §10-3-1106 members of 
the police department and heads of departments. Ward has been 
exempted from statutory protection both as a member of the police 
department and as a department head. 
The rule, in the absence of statutory tenure or 
expectation, is well settled that: 
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. . . if municipal officers are appointed or 
elected, as by a council or board, and a 
definite term is not prescribed, the officer 
holds at the will or pleasure of his superior 
or the appointing or electing authority, and, 
therefore, the power of removal may be 
exercised at any time by such person or 
agency. Yorkley, Municipal Corporations, 
§339, p. 68, 1957: 
Where an appointed municipal or county 
officer does not hold office for a fixed term 
or under expressed or implied restrictions as 
to the manner of his removal from office, it 
is common for the Court to express his tenure 
as being at the "pleasure11 [Sheriff vs. 
Commissioners cited supra uses this term] of 
the appointing power. If a municipal or 
county office is in fact held at the pleasure 
of the appointing power, there seems to be no 
doubt that the removal may be accomplished 
without notice or hearing. 56 Am.Jur.2d, 
Municipal Corporations, §333. See also Glenn 
vs. Town of Georgetown, 36 Colo. App. 431, 
543 P.2d 726 (1975), holding, absent an 
applicable state statute or specific 
ordinance, there is implicit in the power of 
a city or town to fire the power to discharge 
at any time without notice of written charges 
or a hearing. See Ends vs. City of Boulder, 
587 P.2d 39 (Nev. 1978). 
In the instant case, Ward held the position of police 
chief by appointment of the mayor and city council; he does not 
hold for any term of office. Section 10-3-1105 specifically 
excludes the police chief from the administrative review provided 
by §10-3-1106. Ward holds the position at the will of the mayor 
and council. The only issue Ward could litigate on remand is 
whether the mayor and council voted to terminate him and the 
affidavits in this case conclusively dispose of that issue. 
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ISSUE III: NO STATUTE, INCLUDING §52-4-6, REQUIRES FORMAL 
ACTION BY THE GOVERNING BODY TO DISMISS AN 
EMPLOYEE TO BE LISTED ON THE MEETING AGENDA. 
and 
ISSUE IV: NO ACTION WAS TAKEN IN A CLOSED MEETING TO DISMISS 
WARD. 
Wardfs principal claim is that Utah's "Sunshine Law" 
was violated incident to his termination as chief of police. 
In 1977 the Utah Legislature adopted the Open and 
Public Meeting Act; popularly titled the "Sunshine Law" 
(references are to Utah Code Annotated, 1953). The Act's express 
purpose is to keep the public informed (§52-4-1 and §52-4-3). It 
provides that meetings are open to the public (§52-4-3) and that 
an agenda be delivered, not to the persons whose property or 
rights are involved, but to the news media, not less than 24 
hours before a meeting (§52-4-6). The penalty for violation of 
those requirements is that action taken is "voidable" by a Court 
of competent jurisdiction (§52-4-8). The Act does not establish 
a procedure to be followed in dealing with private rights to 
property, liberty, employment, or governmental regulation such as 
taxation, zoning or public utility operation; nor with respect to 
budgets or bonded indebtedness. It is purely a statute providing 
that interested persons can ascertain what public matters will be 
considered and allow them to ascertain (and publish if they 
choose) how the members of the governing body voted. Most 
significantly for purposes of this action, it does not establish 
any "right to be heard" or to participate in debate or to be 
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represented by witnesses or legal counsel upon or in matters to 
be considered by the public bodies regulated by the Sunshine Act. 
In other words, it is informational in its objectives and it does 
not provide any "procedural process" even for persons directly 
affected by legislative acts of the governing body. 
It is important to observe the sanction clause for 
violations of the Open and Public Meeting law. This is found in 
§52-2-8 and does not provide that acts are void if there is a 
violation of §52-4-3 or §52-4-6. It provides they are voidable 
by a court of competent jurisdiction. Only if the Trial Court's 
action in refusing to void a legislative action by a City's 
Governing Body were arbitrary, capricious, or whimsical would it 
be applicable. 
Under no exaggeration of the facts can it be concluded 
that either of those statutes was violated. Section 52-4-3 
states that every meeting is open to the public unless closed 
pursuant to §52-4-5. 
The meeting was closed by a unanimous vote of the 
Council and Mayor (R. 226) to comply with §52-4-4 and the 
executive session convened by §52-4-5(a) allowing discussion of 
the professional confidence of an individual to prevent harm to 
that person's reputation. 
Section 52-4-6 provides only for the statement of a 
proposed agenda (stating only what the council intends to take up 
as that intention is framed at the time the "agenda" is drawn 
up) . There is nothing in §52-4-6 which requires the agenda to 
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state every item for discussion. 
In this Court's ruling on June 17, 1981, the following 
determination was made: 
3. The Court finds that the Defendants had 
the legal right to hold the meeting of April 
2, 1981, and that during the course of the 
open meeting the City Council went into a 
closed meeting and that among the other 
business was the determination to terminate 
the Plaintiff as chief of police which was a 
subject discussed at the closed portion of 
the meeting and that in the ensuing open 
portion of the meeting a minute entry was 
filed and made of record terminating the 
services of the Plaintiff as chief of police. 
[Emphasis added] 
The Supreme Court did not reverse this finding. It 
only said the "sole issue before this [the Supreme] Court is the 
question of whether the Court had jurisdiction." It is now clear 
that Courts do have jurisdiction. It also has jurisdiction to 
grant Summary Judgment because Ward's claims do not entitle him 
to any relief. 
ISSUE V; APPEAL PROCEDURES UNDER §§10-3-1105 AND 10-3-1106 
EXPRESSLY EXCLUDE (1) POLICE OFFICERS; AND (2) 
DEPARTMENT HEADS; WARD BEING BOTH. 
and 
ISSUE VIII: WARD'S PHANTOM "RICHFIELD CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT 
POLICIES AND PROCEDURES MANUAL". IF ANYTHING AT 
ALL, WAS AUTHORED BY, AND PROVIDES EXCLUSIVE MEANS 
OF APPEALING DISCHARGE ONLY TO AND AS FAR AS, WARD 
AS CHIEF OF POLICE - IN OTHER WORDS HIMSELF. 
The Mayor, with the advise and consent of the Council, 
appointed Ward to the position of Richfield City chief of police, 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §10-3-916 (1981). This Governing 
Body had the authority to dismiss Ward, without a hearing, 
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notice, or cause. In Hutchison vs. Cartwright, 692 P. 2d 772, 773-
774 (Utah 1984), the court held that unless otherwise controlled 
by statute, the power to suspend or dismiss is appurtenant to the 
power to appoint. "When an individual is appointed by an 
official, 'the office is held during the pleasure of the 
authority making the appointment, and ... no notice or charges or 
hearings are required for the suspension or removal by the 
authority appointing the officer.111 Id. at 774 [quoting Sheriff 
of Salt Lake County vs. Board of Commissioners, 71 Utah 593, 268 
P. 783, 784 (1928)]. "The rule of common law was that the 
appointment to municipal office carried with it no vested 
property interest in continued employment, and such officers were 
subject to removal without cause, reason or hearing unless 
otherwise prescribed." Carlson vs. Bratton, 681 P. 2d 1333, 1337 
(Wyo. 1984). Since the Utah Supreme Court determined that §10-3-
911 did not apply, there is no statute explicitly governing the 
dismissal of chiefs of police or city marshals in third class 
cities. Therefore, based on common law, we urge that the Mayor 
and the Council had independent authority to discharge Ward, 
without a hearing, notice, or cause. 
Ward, nevertheless, contends that he has a right to 
appeal his discharge under §§10-3-1105 and -1106. Section 10-3-
1105 provides that "[a]11 appointive officers and employees of 
municipalities, other than members of the police departments, 
fire departments, heads of departments, and superintendents, 
shall hold their employment without limitation of time, being 
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subject to discharge or dismissal only as hereinafter provided," 
[Emphasis added] Ward argues that he does not fall within the 
exception because he is not a member of a "police department" per 
se, but a city marshal with appointed assistants. However, we 
read §§10-3-1105 and -1106 as specifically excluding him. Other 
sections in Title 10 use the term "chief of police" 
interchangeably with "city marshal." See, e.g., Utah Code 
Annotated §10-3-918 (1986). As Chief of Police, it is 
inescapable that Ward is both a member of a "police department" 
and the head of that "department". 
Ward also argues that even if he falls within the 
exceptions to §10-3-1105 because he is a chief of police, 
nevertheless, the language in the second sentence of §10-3-1106 
applies to "any officer." Because these sections must be read 
together and should harmonize with the purpose of the whole act, 
Jensen vs. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 679 P.2d 903, 906 (Utah 
1984), we believe that the language "as hereinafter provided" in 
§10-3-1105 specifically modifies the sections that follow. 
"Separate parts of [an] act should not be construed in isolation 
from the rest of the act." Id. See also Stahl vs. Utah Transit 
Authority, 618 P.2d 480, 481 (Utah 1980). Therefore, "any 
officer" as appears in §10-3-1106 must mean any officer not 
excluded in §10-3-1105. Ward vs. Richfield City, 776 P. 2d at 96 
and 97. 
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ISSUE VI: ACCEPTING THE STIPULATED FACTS AND APPELLANT'S 
ARGUMENT OF FACTS, THE TRIAL COURT'S SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT AGAINST THE APPELLANT (WARD) WAS STILL 
BASED ON UNCONTRADICTED AFFIDAVITS ESTABLISHING 
THE ESSENTIAL FACTS. 
This Issue has been argued in the "General Statement". 
Please see pages 13 through 17 of General Statement. 
ISSUE VII: THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY ARTICULATED THE 
EXPRESS LANGUAGE OF THE OPEN AND PUBLIC MEETING 
ACT WHICH IS SUFFICIENTLY CLEAR TO REQUIRE NO 
CONSTRUCTION. 
To avoid repetition please see our argument under Issue 
IIIf pages 26 through 29. 
The following are additional Issues which the Court 
should consider in arriving at its decision on Certiorari: 
ISSUE X: EVEN IF THE BERUBE STANDARDS WERE OFFENDED IN 
THIS CASE (WHICH WE SUBMIT THEY ARE NOT) BERUBE 
SHOULD NOT BE APPLIED RETROSPECTIVELY TO 1981. 
This Court in Bembe made two pronouncements which 
imply that the Bembe rules are to be applied prospectively. In 
the lead opinion Justice Durham comprehensively detailed the 
development and establishment of the at-will rule in Utah then 
concluded that: 
Admittedly the concept of good faith and 
fair dealing is not susceptible to bright-
line definitions and tests. It should 
therefore be used sparingly and with caution. 
When true injustice has been incurred, relief 
should be provided. Care must be exercised to 
avoid eclipsing the rule by expanding the 
exception. (771 P.2d at 1047). 
In Justice Zimmerman's opinion concurring in the result 
stated: 
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All that being said, we are reversing and 
remanding this matter for trial and are 
signaling a change in the employment-at-will 
law of Utah. (771 P.2d at 1051). 
Therefore Berube should not be interpreted in such a 
way as to modify Hutchison vs. Cartwright. 
ISSUE XI: THE OPEN AND PUBLIC MEETING ACT (CH. 4, TITLE 52, 
U.C.A. 1953) IS NOT A DUE PROCESS STATUTE. 
As the Court of Appeals stated, 776 P.2d at 95: 
The purpose of the Utah Open and Public 
Meetings Act is to insure that the actions of 
the State, its agencies, and political 
subdivisions are conducted openly. [See 
Common Cause of Utah v. Utah Public Serv. 
Comm'n, 598 P.2d 1312 (Utah 1979).] 
Political subdivisions, as defined in Utah 
Code Ann. §10-1-201 (1981), include municipal 
corporations and municipalities. Utah Code 
Ann. §10-3-601 (1981) provides that all 
meetings of the governing body of each 
municipality shall be held in compliance with 
the provisions of the open and public 
meetings law. 
Ward contends that Richfield City failed to 
comply with the agenda and notice provisions 
of the open meetings law and that such 
failure should void the action taken at the 
April meeting. Ward argues that the subject 
of his discharge should have been listed on 
the agenda, even if discussions regarding him 
were conducted in a closed meeting. This 
contention fails for two reasons. First, the 
open meetings act designates certain subjects 
which are exempt from discussion in open 
meetings. See section 52-4-5. Where at 
least two-thirds of the public body present 
at an open meeting vote to hold a closed 
meeting to discuss the character, 
professional competence, or physical or 
mental health of an individual, then a closed 
meeting may be held. See section 52-4-4. 
The Council voted in the April open meeting 
to sequester themselves to discuss Ward's 
professional competence in compliance with 
section 52-4-4. The Council concluded the 
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closed meeting with a unanimous vote, one 
member abstaining, to discharge Ward. 
Minutes of the closed meeting were recorded 
and when the Council resumed open session, a 
formal vote to discharge Ward was taken. 
(776 P.2d 95). 
ISSUE XII; THERE WAS NO BREACH OF THE IMPLIED COVENANT OF 
GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING; THAT ISSUE IS RES 
JUDICATA. 
For months the City Councilman in charge of the Police 
Department pleaded with Ward to soften his regimentation toward 
his subordinates (R. 250 and 251) . In the opinion by Judge 
Winder granting Richfield summary judgment in a civil rights 
action, the Federal District Court ruled that Ward had not been 
deprived of a liberty interest (pp. 7 and 8, Decision of United 
States District Court, July 11, 1983, attached as Appendix v.l 
and v.2). 
A judgment or decree rendered by a Federal Court of 
competent jurisdiction, as to issues litigated on the merits, is 
res judicata. 50 C.J.S. p. 518, Judgments §899, just as a State 
Court judgment is res judicata in the Federal Court (Id. at p. 
522). Federal Court judgments are entitled in the courts of any 
state to the same effect, respect and conclusiveness as would be 
accorded under similar circumstances to the judgments of a state 
tribunal of equal authority. 50 C.J.S. p. 531, Judgments §901. 
A Federal Court judgment is conclusive and undisputable as to all 
points and issues adjudicated in the Federal Court action. (§901 
Id. p. 534, sub-section b.) 
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I n Curry vs. Educoa Preschool Inc., 580 P . 2d 2 2 4 , t h i s 
Court stated: 
We hold that the involuntary dismissal of the 
plaintiff's case in the federal court, on the 
court's own motion, constitutes a final 
judgment on the merits; which judgment is 
entitled to res judicata effect. As such, it 
is a bar to a subsequent action involving the 
same issues in the courts of Utah. 
Therefore, the matter of Good Faith and Fair Dealing is 
a matter decided on its merits in the Federal District Court to 
the extent that Ward's dismissal was not malicious or in wanton 
disregard of any of Ward's rights. 
Under the "traditions of fair play" stated in Berube, 
no member of the city government (other than the police officers 
whose complaints are described hereinabove) has ever, at any 
time, officially or unofficially published, communicated, or 
promulgated any statement, declaration, release of information as 
news, or made any other disclosure, statement, declaration, 
representation, or utterance, written or unwritten, which 
discredited, criticized, subjected to hatred, contempt, or 
ridicule, or impugned the integrity of Ward. One of the purposes 
for calling the "executive session" was to avoid publication or 
dissemination of any comment, any statement, or declaration which 
would discredit Ward. A policy of careful endeavor to avoid 
criticism of Ward, either publicly or privately, by Richfield, 
its elected and appointed officials, and anyone in the employ of 
Richfield has been pursued at all times. (R. 248 - 254) 
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All members were present at all times during the entire 
meetings of April 2 and June 8, 1981. At no time was the 
personal characteristics, integrity, reputation, trustworthiness, 
morality, honesty, or Ward's reputation for any of the same, 
discussed or disclosed except for the ability of Ward to lead and 
obtain the confidence of the police officers serving under Ward, 
which ability was adversely commented upon and criticized. (Id.) 
Prior to April 2, 1981, Duane Wilson, the City 
Councilman in charge of the Department of Public Safety of 
Richfield, made statements in defense of the activities and 
performance of Ward as chief of police and defended openly and by 
words and conduct against charges made against Ward of his 
incapability of cultivating confidence and to lead his men, which 
charges were brought against him by members of the police force 
and mentioned in City Council meetings. Defendant Duane Wilson 
made many statements to the effect that Ward was a "good 
administrator" and the members of the City Council and the Mayor 
unanimously expressed the opinion that Ward was a "good 
administrator" but lacked qualities which would inspire or 
galvanize loyalty to the police force or to Richfield in matters 
affecting morale of the police officers. (R. 248) 
It is difficult to prove a negative proposition, i.e.: 
that a conspiracy did not exist. However, here is positive 
evidence that a conspiracy could not have existed because of the 
objective, overt act of the governing body to choose a councilman 
who was not opposed to Ward as chief of police. 
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There can be no conspiracy where the acts complained 
of, and the means employed in doing the acts, are lawful. 16 
Am.Jur.2d p. 267, Conspiracy, §49 (citing both federal and state 
cases). 
CONCLUSION 
The City has acted in good faith in compliance with the 
law applicable to cities and governmental subdivisions in 1981. 
In fact, its conduct meets all the standards of the Berube case 
and decisions which that benchmark decision has produced. 
Ward repeats incessantly a claim that Richfield City 
had Policies and Procedures for termination but he produces none. 
Failing that, he falls back upon a State statute which expressly 
excludes policemen and department heads. Under Ward's theory the 
only person who could terminate Ward was Ward. 
Richfield has done nothing wrong. 
Respectfully submitted, 
OLSEN, McIFF & CHAMBERLAIN 
Ken Chamberlain 
Attorneys for Defendants-
Respondents 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that four (4) copies of the foregoing 
Brief of Respondents were mailed to Mr. George E. Brown, Jr., 
Attorney for Plaintiff and Appellant, 7001 South 900 East, Suite 
240, Midvale, Utah (84047), by U.S. regular mail, postage 
prepaid, on this 1st day of March, 1990. 
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Kule 65A. Injunctions. 
(a) Preliminary; notice. No preliminary injunction shall be issued without 
notice to the adverse party. 
(b) Temporary restraining order; notice; rehearing; duration. No tem-
porary restraining order shall be granted without notice to the adverse party 
unless it clearly appears from specific facts shown by affidavit or by the veri-
fied complaint that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will 
result to the applicant before notice can be served and a hearing had thereon. 
Every temporary restraining order granted without notice shall be endorsed 
with the date and hour of issuance; and shall be filed forthwith in the clerk's 
office and entered of record; shall define the injury and state why it is irrepa-
rable and why the order was granted without notice; and shall expire by its 
terms within such time after entry, not to exceed 10 days, as the court fixes, 
unless within the time so fixed the order, for good cause shown, is extended for 
a like period or unless the party against whom the order is directed consents 
that it may be extended for a longer period. The reasons for the extension 
shall be entered of record. In case a temporary restraining order is granted 
without notice, the motion for a preliminary injunction shall be set down for 
hearing at the earliest possible time and takes precedence of all matters 
except older matters of the same character; and when the motion comes on for 
hearing the party who obtained the temporary restraining order shall proceed 
with the application for a preliminary injunction and, if he does not do so, the 
court shall dissolve the temporary restraining order. On 2 days' notice to the 
party who obtained the temporary restraining order without notice or on such 
shorter notice to that party as the court may prescribe, the adverse party may 
appear and move its dissolution or modification and in that event the court 
shall proceed to hear and determine such motion as expeditiously as the ends 
of justice require. 
(c) Security. Except as otherwise provided by law, no restraining order or 
preliminary injunction shall issue except upon the giving of security by the 
applicant, in such sum as the court deems proper, for the payment of such 
costs and damages as may be incurred or suffered by any party who is found to 
have been wrongfully enjoined or restrained. No such security shall be re-
quired of the United States, the state of Utah, or of an officer, agency, or 
subdivision of either; nor shall it be required of a married person in a suit 
against the other party to the marriage contract. 
A surety upon a bond or undertaking under this rule submits himself to the 
jurisdiction of the court and irrevocably appoints the clerk of the court as his 
agent upon whom any papers affecting his liability on the bond or undertak-
ing may be served. His liability may be enforced on motion without the neces-
sity of an independent action. The motion and such notice of the motion as the 
court prescribes may be served on the clerk of the court who shall forthwith 
mail copies to the persons giving the security if their addresses are known. 
(d) Form and scope of injunction or restraining order; service. Every 
order granting an injunction and every restraining order shall be specific in 
terms; shall describe in reasonable detail, and not by reference to the com-
plaint or other document, the act or acts sought to be restrained; and is bind-
ing only upon the parties to the action, their officers, agents, servants, em-
ployees, and attorneys, and upon those persons in active concert or participa-
tion with them who receive actual notice of the order by personal service or 
otherwise. 
(e) Grounds for injunction. An injunction may be granted: 
(1) when it appears by the pleadings on file that a party is entitled to 
the relief demanded, and such relief, or any part thereof, consists in re-
straining the commission or continuance of some act complained of, either 
for a limited period or perpetually; 
(2) when it appears from the pleadings or by affidavit that the commis-
sion or continuance of some act during the litigation would produce great 
or irreparable injury to the party seeking injunctive relief; 
(3) when it appears during the litigation that either party is doing or 
threatens, or is about to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some 
act in violation of the rights of another party respecting the subject mat-
ter of the action, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual; 
(4) in all other cases where an injunction would be proper in equity. 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SEVIER COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
BOYD A. WARD, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
RICHFIELD CITY, a municipal 
Corporation, et al, 
Defendant. 
The Plaintiff and Defendant's Motions for Summary Judgments 
on stipulated facts came before the Court on July 30, 1986. 
The Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted. The 
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment is Denied. The Defendant's 
Objection to Bill of Costs is Denied, except for the amount of the 
cash bond which has been returned by Court Order to Plaintiff. 
The Court finds that in accordance with 10-6-32 UCA, the law in 
effect at the time of this case*the term of the Chief of Police of a 
Third Class City shall be until the municipal election next following 
his appointment, unless sooner removed by the Mayor with the concurrence 
of a majority of members of the City Council, or by the City Council with 
the concurrence of the mayor. 
The Court finds that Richfield City called a public meeting; 
that the agenda delivered to the news media, did not have on it any 
information concerning the termination of the Police Chief; that the 
City Council went into executive session during the public meeting 
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and later reconvened to announce the Police Chief termination. 
Section 52-4-3 UCA provides that meetings should be open to 
the public. Section 52-4-8 provides that any final action taken in vio-
lation of Section 52-4-3 and Section 52-4-6 is voidable by a Court of 
competent jurisdiction. 
The absence of an item of business on the Agenda does not preclude 
its consideration. The "sunshine law" 52-4-1 UCA etc., provides that 
meetings are open to the public. The agenda is to be delivered to the 
news media. The penalty for violation is voidable by a Court of competent 
jurisdiction. Tie act does not establish any right to be heard or to 
participate in debate, or to be represented by witnesses or legal council. 
The purpose of the act is informational in its objective and does not 
provide a procedural process for persons affected by legislative acts 
of the Council except as above stated. 
The Court finds that it would not be in the public interest to 
void the action taken by the Richfield City Council on April 2, 1981, and 
as ratified by it in a June 8, 1981 meeting. 
The only issue the Plaintiff in this case could litigate is whether 
or not the Mayor and Counsel voted to terminate him, and the affidavits 
filed in this case conclusively stated they did and they thereby dispose 
of that issue. 
The Court finds that the dismissal was not malicious or in wanton 
disregard of Plaintiff's rights. 
Occupational Job Title: CHIEF OP POLICE 
Position Purpose: 
The Chief of Police is the chief executive officer 
of the Department and the final departmental authority 
in all imttera of policy, operations, and discipline. 
He exercises a^ .l lawful powers of his office and 
issues such lav/ful orders as are necessary to assure 
the effective performance of the Department, He 
shall c'irect and control the City's needs for police 
interests and demands. 
Responsibilities: 
The Chief of Police commensurate, within policy 
guidelines and legal constraints, has the authority 
to coordinate and direct assigned personnel and other 
allocated resources in achieving his organizational 
objectives. In so doing, he must perform the full 
range of administration functions, relying upon policy 
direction, training and personal initiative to guide 
him and the Department. 
He shall be responsible through the Department, for 
the enforcement of all laws coming within its legal 
jurisdiction. The Chief of Police is responsible for 
planning, directing, coordinating, controlling and 
staffing of all activities of the Department for its 
continued and efficient operation, for the completion 
and forwarding of such reports as may be required 
by competent authority and for the Department relations 
with the citizens we serve as well as with outside 
agencies. 
POLICIES AND PROCEDURES Policy No, 2 
bate January 1, 1979 
Subject Definitions 
Effective Date January 1, 1979 
This directive shall supersede all other departmental 
policies dealing with definitions. 
Policies and Procedures* 
Written directives issued at *Vpartnental level by 
the Chiei. Policies and Prooeeures remain in full 
force and effect until amiv.ended, superseded or 
cancelled by the issuing authority. Departmental 
Policies an3 Procedures establish policy, procedures 
or regulations governing matters which affect the 
entire Department. They are the most authoritlve 
directive issued in the Department end may be used to 
ammen3, supersede, or cancel c*ny other rule, regulation, 
or order. 
Speqlal Orders: 
written Directives issued at Departmental or Divisional 
level by th^ Chief or a command officer. They specify* 
instructions governing particular situations. Special 
Orders are automatically cancelled when their objectives 
are achieved. 
Departmental Memoranda: 
Information bulletins, containing suggestions, notices, 
or official announcements of general interest* 
POLICIES AND PROCEDURES Policy NO. 10 
Date January 1, 1979 
Subject Departmental Discipline 
Effective Date January 1, 1979 
This directive shall supersede all other departmental policies* 
dealing with departmental discipline. 
Persons Subject to Disciplinary Action 
A. Any officer who violates his trust by committing 
any offense punishable under the l^ws, ordinances, or 
statutes of the United States, the State of Utah, the City 
of Richfield; or who violates any provisions Qf the Rules 
and Regulations of the Richfield City Police Department; or 
who disobeys any lawful order; or who is incompetent to 
perform his duties? is subject to appropriate disciplinary 
action. 
B. The word "discipline" is a derivative of the latin word 
"disciplina"* meaning instruction or education. The 
purpose of discipline is to facilitate coordination of 
effort. Positive discipline is an inner personal desire to 
observe and follow the regulations and procedures of an 
organisation. Negative discipline is compliance through 
fear of punishment or penalty. It is the hope that all 
officers will exercise positive discipline. 
C. Penalties - Subject to the aoproval of the Chief of Police, 
the following penalties may be imposed against any 
officer or employee of the Department as disciplinary 
action: 
1) Verbal
 reP*-'J*nd-
2) Hr4 ,~ e n r o*n r i m a n d -
Suspension* 
4) Demotion. 
5) Dismissal. 
Departmental Authority to Discipline 
D. Pinal departmental disciplinary authority and responsibility 
rests with the Chief of Police* Except for verbal 
reprimands and emergency suspensions, all departmental 
discipline must be taken or approved by the Chief of 
Police. 
E. Other supervisory personnel may take the following 
disciplinary measures: 
1) Verbal reprimand. 
2) Written reprimand (subject to approval by the commanding 
officer)• 
3) Emergency suspensions. 
4) Written recommendations for other penalties. 
P. Emergency Suspension - Any command or supervisory officer 
has the authority to impose emergency suspension until the 
next business day against an officer or employee when it is 
apparent that such action is in the best interest of the 
Department. 
G. Pollow-Up Action on Emergency Suspension - An officer or 
employee receiving an emergency suspension shall be 
required to report to the Chief of Police on the next business 
day at 1000 hours (10:00 a.m.) unless otherwise directed 
by competent authority. The command or supervisory officer 
C-82-0467W 
in continued employment and no constitutional deprivation could 
have occurred. See Bishop v. Wood, supra? Board of Regents v. 
Roth, supra. 
This court must also determine whether the plaintiff 
has been deprived of a liberty interest. It is undisputed that 
the following news release was formulated by the city council 
upon the termination of the plaintiff: 
In a meetinq between the Richfield City Chief 
of Police and the Richfield City Council on 
Thursday, April 2, 1981# Boyd Wardf Richfield 
City Chief of Police, was relieved of duty 
effective April 3, 1981. It was felt by the 
Mayor and the Council that internal problems 
in the department made this change necessary. 
The plaintiff also refers this court to a newspaper 
article which appeared in the Deseret News April 4, 1981. The 
article reads in pertinent part: 
RICHFIELD - Richfield Police Chief Boyd 
Ward has been relieved of his-post by the 
city Council. 
Mayor Kendrick Harwood was not available 
for comment Friday, but a Councilman said 
there had been internal problems in the 
police department along with criticism and 
letters to the editor in a local newspaper 
that led to the firing. 
The councilman praised Ward for his 
administration (sic) ability and "buildinq a 
fine police department," however. 
Ward declined comment on his firing. 
• 
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The statement about the plaintiff being terminated for 
internal problems in the interview with a council member has, 
according to the plaintiff, caused siqnificant damage in that the 
plaintiff has been unable to refute the accusation against him in 
order to find a new position as chief of police in another 
community. This court is aware that the Supreme Court held in 
Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980), that the 
dismissal of a chief of police accompanied by charqes that miaht 
damage his reputation, without the benefit of a hearina, amounts 
to a deprivation of liberty without due process of law. Lookina 
to the undisputed facts of this case, however, it is clear to 
this court that this is not a case where the plaintiff's 
interests in liberty have been implicated. The council did not 
relieve him of his position as chief of police on a charqe that 
he had been guilty of dishonesty or immorality, nor does this 
court see any indication whatever that the plaintiff's good name, 
reputation, honor or integrity is at stake. See Board of Regents 
v. Roth, 408 U.S. at 573.' 
the plaintiff to be true, under the StanSsaOUZA 
Supreme Court this courtsfiiids ,W5liflf1 
arising from the actions of the city eouiUflftV' 
It follows that if there has been no deprivation of 
property rights or liberty interests, there can be no actionable 
conspiracy. It is axiomatic that there can be no cause of action 
